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Surface Warfare Officers (SWO) attending the Naval Post-
graduate School were surveyed on career issues pertaining to
career path specialization, warfare skills, SWO qualifica-
tion, and their impact on readiness. Survey results
indicate that: (1) SWO technical competency does not
mandate specialization as a means to enhance readiness, (2)
assigning department heads to single 30+ month tours and/or
rotating them to provide officer continuity through work-up
and deployment may enhance readiness, (3) implementation of
SWO qualification policy may not be supporting adequate
qualification standards. Recommendations include: (1)
analyses of officer perceptual attitudes and viewpoints
should be part of policy formulation, (2) feasibility and
readiness impact studies of alternative department head
assignment rotation and tour length policies should be
completed, (3) revisions to the methods used to implement
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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary mission of the peacetime Navy is readiness.
Readiness is a complex problem with many variables. Each
variable must contribute if sufficient readiness is to be
achieved. This interdependence suggests that readiness is
constrained by the contribution of the weakest variable. In
recent years the ability of the surface warfare officer
(SWO) community to adequately contribute to readiness has
been questioned. Inadequacies in the preparation of SWOs
and the structure of the community may be constraining
readiness.
Surface warfare officer management policy pertaining to
career path specialization, assignment rotation and tour
length, and qualification issues may not best support
readiness because SWO perceptions of policy and its
perceived impact in the fleet were not adequately evaluated
and integrated into the policy development process.
Formulation of SWO career path policy best supports officer
management policy objectives and therefore readiness, when
the evaluation of SWO perceptions are integrated into the
policy development process.
The objective of this thesis is to provide an analysis
of officer perceptions regarding policy issues with the
intent that revisions to policy, incorporating analysis
results would more effectively contribute to readiness and
officer management goals. With regard to future policy
development, comprehensive measurement and analysis of SWO
perceptions relevant to policy formulation has several
advantages. It may reveal expectations acceptance regarding
SWO policy alternatives under consideration. If these
perceptions can be identified during the formulation of
policy concepts, community managers can use this information
to develop policy that more effectively meets community
managers' goals. Analysis can also provide a needed source




The purpose of the research is to survey and analyze
officer perceptions of career path specialization,
assignment, and qualification issues. The merits of
alternative career path specialization policies will be
evaluated with regard to SWO perceptions of their relative
benefit to the Navy and their relative compatibility with
officer career goals. The perceived relationships between
officer professional attributes and career path specializa-
tion and readiness will be examined. Department head
assignment policy will be examined to determine if SWOs
believe alternatives to the fixed tour length and rotation
policies would better support readiness. The perceived
adequacy of the SWO qualification system will be examined to
determine if its structure and implementation support
perceived minimum fleet requirements and support adequate
performance and qualification standards.
B. THESIS STRUCTURE
The introduction presents the problem and states the
objectives and purpose of the analysis. The following
chapter presents hypothesis development within the review of
literature. The third chapter, the research methodology, is
a chronology of the survey development, data collection,
demographic summary, data analysis, and development of the
analytic tools implemented to test the hypotheses. The
fourth chapter presents results of the hypothesis testing.
The fifth chapter is a discussion of the hypothesis test
results and the final chapter presents the analysis summary
and conclusions.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Generalized hypotheses were formed to provide the basis
for construction of the survey. Within each generalized
hypothesis, sub-hypotheses were defined to test the
generalized hypothesis. These sub-hypotheses were
constructed to test issues, alternatives, risks, benefits
and other factors relevant to the testing of the generalized
hypothesis.
A. CAREER PATH SPECIALIZATION
Traditionally, the SWO has been a "jack of all trades"
who must be prepared to fight in each of the three
environments of naval warfare; on the sea, under the sea,
and above the sea. In addition to warfare competency at the
interface of the three environments, a SWO was expected to
master naval engineering, weapons systems, communications,
repair, damage control and administration to name a few.
However, the complexity and technology of modern naval
warfare may have made this philosophy obsolescent. As a
result, there has been increasing emphasis to identify and
implement the changes necessary to restructure the community
and better prepare SWOs to meet the readiness challenges of
modern naval warfare.
In 1983 the SWO career path was restructured in an
effort to redress the perceived inadequacies in officer
training and assignment policies. A primary objective of
the policy changes was to increase readiness by utilizing
SWOs in the same specialty area for their department head
assignments. It was believed that increased officer
technical competency and greater specific assignment
experience derived through specialization would result in
increased levels of readiness. [Ref. l:pp. 1-4]
As shown in Figure 1 [Ref. l:p. 2], the policy has three
distinct layers. At the division officer level the
prospective SWO gains a general warfare background by
rotating through division officer assignments in at least
two different departments aboard his first ship. Based on
his division officer background and performance, the
qualified SWO is then tracked to a specific departmental
area for his department head tours. Finally, the post
department head SWO is given additional training prior to
executive officer (XO) assignment to insure he has the
necessary broad-based generalized competencies to function
effectively as an XO and later as a commanding officer (CO)
.
Three feasible alternatives exist on which department
head specialization may be structured. The adequacy of each
alternative is assumed to be a function of two variables.
The first variable is the evaluation of each specialization





























































Figure 1. New SWO Career Path
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career goals. It is assumed that specialization
compatibility with career aspirations is a critical
implementation issue. The second variable is the perceived
benefit to the Navy of each specialization alternative.
Specialization by department is the first alternative.
This is the structure currently implemented and described
above. Within this structure, department heads would be
assigned exclusively to one departmental area (Operations,
Weapons/Combat Systems/Deck, Engineering) for their
department head tours. Under this alternative, a department
head would be assured of rotation within a departmental area
but not within a specific warfare area. For example, an
operations specialist might find himself assigned to a
combatant for his first tour and an amphibious force ship
for his second tour.
Specialization by warfare area was the second
alternative approach examined. Within this structure, two
warfare tracks are designated. The first incorporates
amphibious warfare, combat logistics and mine warfare while
the second track incorporates all forms of combatant
warfare. Under this alternative a department head would be
assigned in the same warfare area for each tour but would
not necessarily be assigned to the same departmental area.
For example, an amphibious warfare specialist might find
himself assigned as an engineering department head on his
first tour and as an operations officer on his second tour.
The third alternative is an above decks/below decks
split of career paths [Ref. 2:p. 98]. Prior to department
head assignment, qualified SWOs would be split into one of
two career paths. Officers tracked as engineering and
material specialists, the below decks track, would have a
separate career path without the opportunity for command at
sea. However, under this alternative they would be assured
of equivalent advancement and promotion through an expanded
engineering career path. They would advance through
engineering and material specialist sea assignments while
shore assignments would consist of rotation through repair
organizations, material commands, and acquisition
assignments. All other SWO's would be assigned to the more
traditional above decks track that would lead to command at
sea and operational oriented shore assignments. The merits
of this specialization alternative are discussed in Swinger
[Ref. 2:pp. 98-100].
1. Hypothesis 1
The null hypothesis states that each specialization
approach is equally beneficial to the Navy and compatible
with career goals. To implement this test, three sub-
hypotheses were defined which compare the perceived benefit
to the Navy with the perceived compatibility with career
goals for each of the three alternatives.
2.
Hypothesis 2
The objective of this hypothesis is to determine
which of the three specialization alternatives, defined in
Hypothesis 1, is perceived to be most beneficial to the
Navy. The null hypothesis states that each specialization
alternative is equally beneficial to the Navy. Three sub-
hypotheses were defined that test the three specialization
alternatives pair-wise with regard to perceived benefit to
the Navy.
3 Hypothesis 3
The objective of this hypothesis is to determine
which of the three specialization alternatives is perceived
to be most compatible with career goals. The null
hypothesis states that each specialization alternative is
equally compatible with career goals. Three sub-hypotheses
were defined that test the three specialization alternatives





A major goal of specialization at the department
head level is to increase readiness. It is believed that
greater department head technical and managerial competency
derived through specialization would significantly enhance
readiness. [Ref. l:p. 2] If respondents support
specialization at the department head level for these
reasons then they should perceive that technical and
managerial competencies are more important to the department
head than to the division officer. For the purposes of the
research, importance was defined in terms of two variables.
They are first, the degree to which the competency is
critical to job performance and second, the degree to which
the competency contributes to ship's readiness.
The null hypothesis states that technical and
managerial competencies are as important to the division
officer as they are important to the department head. To
implement this test, the criticality to job performance of
each competency of the department head versus that of the
division officer was tested and the contribution to ship's
readiness of each competency of the department head versus
that of the division officer was tested. The result is four
sub-hypothesis tests for implementing the null hypothesis.
If testing reveals that these competencies are more
important to the department head than to the division
officer, it will be concluded that respondents believe
specialization at the department head level is perceived to
be justified because technical and managerial competencies
are more important to the department head than to the
division officer.
5 . Hypothesis 5
For the purposes of the survey and analysis, four
officer professional attributes were defined. In addition
to technical competency and managerial competency,
10
leadership skills and tactical/watchstanding skills define
the set attributes. These attributes are assumed to be the
inclusive set of most important SWO professional attributes.
The objective of the hypothesis test is to determine if
respondents believe technical and managerial competencies
are the attributes of the department head that contribute
most to ship's readiness. The null hypothesis states that
for a department head, the contributions to ship's readiness
of managerial and technical competencies are equal to those
of other professional attributes. The five sub-hypothesis
tests compare the attributes pair-wise with regard to
contribution to ship's readiness.
If technical and managerial competencies are
believed to contribute more to ship's readiness than do
leadership skills and tactical/watchstanding skills, it may
be concluded that the respondents believe specialization
policy is justified. Rejecting the null hypothesis does not
necessarily imply that specialization policy is not believed
to be justified. It implies only that perceptions of
technical and managerial competencies do not mandate
specialization. In this case identifying the basis for
respondent support of specialization and evaluation of other




The objective of this hypothesis is to evaluate the
perceptual relationships between the criticality to job
performance and the contribution to ship's readiness of the
four department head professional attributes. The null
hypothesis states that each of the department head's
professional attributes contribute as strongly to ship's
readiness as they are critical to job performance. Four
sub-hypothesis tests were defined that test the contribution
to ship's readiness against the criticality to job
performance for each attribute. Determination of the
strength and direction of these relationships may
significantly contribute to the development of officer
related policy whose purpose it is to enhance readiness.
7. Hypothesis 7
The null hypothesis states that specialization
implemented at the department head level would benefit
fleet, material and combat readinesses equally. Each pair-
wise combination of the three readinesses are sub-hypotheses
to be tested with regard to implementation of specialization
policy.
The objectives of the hypothesis test are to
determine, free of the professional attributes issue, if
specialization would significantly benefit readiness and
which aspects of readiness would be perceived to be most
influenced by specialization. In addition to the hypothesis
12
testing of the readiness aspects of specialization, the
analysis will also include an evaluation of the perceived
impact of specialization on future CO/XO effectiveness.
While specialization may enhance readiness it may, in the
future, tend to produce COs and XOs who are less effective
because they do not have the broad expertise and experience
required for these assignments [Ref. 3:p. 5].
B. DEPARTMENT HEAD TOUR LENGTH AND ROTATION
Department head tour length and rotation policy is
another related readiness issue [Ref. 4:pp. 19-22].
Currently, most department heads are assigned to two 18
month split tours while a much smaller percentage are
assigned to 30+ month single tours. The fixed time interval
policy implies department heads are often rotated during
critical training and operational periods. During these
periods, re-assignment of department heads, who are assumed
to be critical to the functioning of the ship's combat
system, may disrupt the development and alter the
effectiveness of the combat team.
1. Hypothesis 8
Department head tour length may greatly influence
readiness. Respondents may believe that, compared to split
touring, a single long tour would tend to promote
significantly higher levels of readiness. The null
hypothesis states that relative to split touring, a single
13
3 month tour would not promote significantly higher levels
of fleet, material or combat readinesses. Each pair-wise
combination of the three readinesses are sub-hypotheses to
be tested with regard to split touring versus the longer
single tour.
Two other relevant aspects of department tour length
will also be evaluated. First, the author contends that
split touring may not be providing the necessary training
opportunities in an 18 month assignment that are required to
develop the warfighting proficiency aboard the particular
platform to which the officer is assigned whereas longer
touring may result in more training opportunities from which
the department head may gain increased warfighting
proficiency. Second, in the SWO community, sustained
superior performance is critical to career advancement. It
is assumed that less than superior performance in a single
long tour may be an unrecoverable setback to an officer's
career. However, split tours allow an officer a second
opportunity to demonstrate superior performance following a
less than superior first tour assignment. Therefore,
respondents may perceive that a longer single tour subjects
the department head to greater career risks.
2 . Hypothesis 9
This and the following hypothesis focus on
department head assignment continuity and its impact on
deployed combat readiness (DCR) [Ref. 4:pp. 19-22]. A
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likely alternative to the fixed time interval department
head rotation policy is a policy that details department
heads according to a ship's schedule. Under this
alternative rotation policy proposal, department heads would
not normally be re-assigned during the pre-deployment work-
up cycle and the subsequent deployment. The objective of
the proposal is to insure department head assignment
continuity from the beginning of the work-up cycle through
deployment. Department heads would be scheduled for
rotation following deployment and prior to the following
work-up cycle.
The null hypothesis states that the proposed
rotation system would have little impact on ship's deployed
combat readiness. Two sub-hypotheses were defined to test
the hypothesis. First, the perception that such a system
would tend to significantly increase ship's DCR was tested
against the perception that rotation of department heads in
the work-up cycle or during deployment has little impact
because DCR is most heavily dependent on other factors.
Second, the perception that such a system would tend to
significantly increase ship's DCR was tested against the
perception that the proposal would have little effect
because ships now deploy as combat ready as is humanly
possible. In addition to providing analysis of the
proposal's impact on DCR, the analysis of the sub-hypothesis
tests should give valuable insight with regard to the
15
perceived dependency of DCR on department continuity and
perceptions of current DCR. The proposal's perceived impact
on officer retention will also be evaluated.
3 . Hypothesis 10
The null hypothesis states that the proposed
rotation system would need to be expanded beyond the
department head level to significantly impact DCR. The sub-
hypotheses test the perception that the proposal would
significantly increase ship's DCR against the perception
that the proposal would need to be expanded beyond the
department head level to significantly impact DCR.
Expanding the proposal beyond the department head
level is assumed to be infeasible. In this case it is
assumed that a command's ability to effectively meet its
obligations when not in work-up and deployment would be
unacceptably degraded by concurrent re-assignment of large
numbers of ship's personnel.
C. SWO TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION
The surface warfare officer training and qualification
system may not be consistently producing officers with the
qualifications necessary to adequately meet the needs of the
fleet. The prospective SWO usually reports aboard his first
ship with six to nine months preparatory training. While
this training is valuable and necessary it is heavily
classroom oriented and generic in nature due to the variety
of platforms and missions in the surface navy. The newly
reporting officer is immediately assigned primary division
officer and collateral duties and tasked to qualify as a
surface warfare officer. More often than not the officer
finds himself so inundated with his duties that pursuing
warfare qualification becomes a subordinate priority and
skills acquired in preparatory training languish. In many
cases this problem is often compounded by inadequate
shipboard officer qualification programs. [Refs. 5:pp. 34-
40; 6:pp. 32-35]
OPNAV instructions give a commanding officer (CO) a
large measure of leeway in defining the scope and
implementing his officer qualification program [Ref. 7:pp.
1-2]. Consequently, the author contends that these programs
tend to be narrowly focused on the particular platform and
mission areas of the particular ship and too little priority
is given to exposing prospective SWO ' s to other communities,
ships and warfare areas. By instruction, CO ' s are
encouraged but not required to provide this exposure to
their junior officers [Ref. 7:pp. 1-2]. It is also believed
that, as a rule, this cross training is not effectively
implemented because it takes the junior officer away from
his division officer and collateral duties. The end result
is a training program that may tend to produce narrowly
qualified SWO ' s who lack the qualifications the fleet
requires.
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The quality of SWO • s produced may even vary between
identical ships with the same mission areas because the
level of performance and expertise required to obtain
qualification varies with each ship's officer qualification
program [Ref. 6:pp. 32-35]. Just as a command defines the
scope of its officer qualification program it also sets the
personal qualification standards which junior officers must
meet.
In summary, the apparent inconsistencies in the quality
of SWO's produced by the training and qualification system
are most likely a consequence of a failure within the
community to establish personal and fleetwide standards for
SWO qualification. Specialization policy, in part, hinges
on the development of uniformly competent, well-rounded and
experienced SWO's prior to department head assignment [Ref.
l:p. 1] . Well-rounded and effective SWO training and
qualification programs will become increasingly critical to
the preparation of SWO's for command as the trend toward
greater specialization continues.
1. Hypothesis 11
Officer qualification programs implemented aboard
most ships consist of three components. They are the SWO
Personal Qualification Standards (PQS) system, close
observation of prospective SWO performance and expertise,
and oral qualification boards. OPNAV Instruction 1412. 2C
delineates minimum qualification eligibility and
18
requirements. Due to the variety of platforms and mission
areas in surface warfare, this instruction also gives the
individual command great latitude in establishing
qualification requirements.
The SWO PQS system serves as the fleetwide framework
for officer qualification. A complete discussion of the PQS
system is contained in OPNAV Instruction 34 00. 34C. For the
purposes of this research, it is assumed PQS primarily
serves four purposes. First, PQS is a learning tool the
prospective SWO uses to gain basic warfare background and
experience. Second, it is a fleetwide minimum standard for
SWO qualification requirements. Third, within the
guidelines of OPNAV instructions, PQS is a flexible tool
which individual commands adapt to suit their SWO
qualification requirements [Ref. 7:pp. 1-2]. Fourth, PQS
provides a documentation tool to chart SWO qualification
progress.
The fleetwide variability in PQS implementation and
in its perceived purposes, together, significantly influence
the ability of the SWO community to consistently produce
uniformly competent and qualified SWO ' s [Ref. 6:p. 33]. The
purpose of this hypothesis is to determine which of the
purposes the PQS system best suits. In addition to
determining the perceived real value of PQS, the rank
ordering of PQS purposes should also give insight into the
variability of its implementation.
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The null hypothesis states that SWO PQS serves
equally as: (1) a tool the prospective SWO uses to gain
background warfare experience, (2) a sufficient fleetwide
standard for the minimum level of warfare qualification
required of a SWO, (3) a flexible tool individual commands
adapt to suit their qualification requirements, and (4) a
tool with which to document qualification progress. Six
sub-hypotheses compare pair-wise each of the four perceived
purposes.
2 . Hypothesis 12
This hypothesis examines the qualification system
with regard to qualification standards. Two types of
standards are assumed to be relevant to SWO qualification.
The first is the perceived minimum qualification criteria
the fleet requires and the second is the system's perceived
sufficiency as a minimum personal performance and expertise
qualification standard.
The null hypothesis states that the present SWO
qualification system meets the minimum qualification
criteria the fleet requires and equally sets sufficient SWO
performance and expertise qualification standards regardless
of whether or not standardization of requirements for SWO
qualification is a relevant issue. Three sub-hypotheses are
defined to implement the hypothesis test. The first
compares the two types of standards while the following two
compare each type of standard to issue relevancy.
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3 . Hypothesis 13
The purpose of the hypothesis test is to evaluate
responsibility for SWO warfare training. Warrior skills are
defined to be those officer skills critical to the direct
management of the combat system and other systems in
executing a ship's combat missions. The individual SWO, the
ship's CO and the Navy are the three levels of responsibili-
ty assumed to be relevant to warrior training [Refs. 4: pp.
19-22; 5:p. 40; 8:p. 22]. The allocation of limited
resources versus competing priorities is the essential issue
for each of the levels of responsibility.
The null hypothesis states that the individual SWO,
ship's CO and the Navy are equally responsible for training
SWOs to be warriors. The six sub-hypotheses are pair-wise
comparisons of the four following perceptions of responsi-
bility. First, it is the individual responsibility of a SWO
to not only do his job but also prepare himself to be a
warrior. Second, it is the responsibility of a ship's CO to
train SWOs to be warriors above all else. Third, the Navy
should be as dedicated to SWO warfare training as it is to
damage control, material readiness, enlisted training, etc.
Fourth, SWO qualification is a personal goal to be attained
by every SWO according to his own faculties and should not
be relegated to the programmed locked-step mode characteris-
tic of other ship's training programs.
Analysis should reveal the strength of perceptual
relationships and identify the responsibility area(s)
perceived to be the most able to bear the opportunity cost
of increased officer warfare training given limited
resources.
4. Hypothesis 14
Fleetwide examination of prospective SWOs as an
additional requirement for SWO qualification appears to be a
feasible method for establishing a fleetwide standard for
SWO qualification. Under this proposal, a prospective SWO
would only be allowed to take the exam with his CO's
permission and only after meeting all other requirements his
CO may have. A discussion of the exam proposal is contained
in James [Ref. 6:p. 34],
The null hypothesis states that a fleetwide SWO
qualification exam would serve to set a minimum standard of
warfare qualification regardless of whether or not an
adequate standard now exists. Three sub-hypotheses are
implemented to test this hypothesis. The perception that an
exam would serve to set an adequate minimum qualification
standard was tested against the following perceptions.
First, the present qualification system sets adequate
minimum fleet criteria. Second, the present qualification
sets adequate expertise and performance qualification
standards. Third, SWO PQS sufficiently standardizes the
minimum level of warfare qualification.
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The purpose of the hypothesis test is to evaluate
the perceived effectiveness of an exam relative to the
perceived effectiveness of the present system in setting
minimum qualification standards.
5. Hypothesis 15
The objective of this hypothesis is to determine the
feasibility of implementing a fleetwide exam. The issue
here is implementation because an exam must in some manner
account for the diversity of the community but not be so
generalized that it fails to be rigorous.
The null hypothesis states that a fleetwide SWO
qualification exam could not be effectively implemented due
to the diversity in the subject area. The sub-hypothesis
tested was that an exam would serve to set an adequate
minimum standard for SWO qualification versus an exam could
not be successfully implemented because of the diversity in
the subject area.
Exam implementation is critical to its perceived
ability to set minimum qualification standards because its
content and structure will greatly influence perceptions




The purpose of this hypothesis is to evaluate
perceptions of two proposed structures for the exam's
implementation. It is assumed that a single exam covering,
in detail, every aspect of surface warfare is not a viable
23
alternative. The two structures are a multiple-versioned
exam and a narrowed single exam [Ref. 6:p 34].
A multiple-versioned exam would consist of several
exams that covered all aspects of surface warfare relevant
to particular types of platforms and mission areas. The
prospective SWO would sit for the particular exam associated
with his platform type and mission areas. The advantage of
this structure is that all aspects of surface warfare from
administration and repair to tactics and system's
capabilities could be covered for each applicable test
version. The disadvantages of this structure are that
versions would tend to ignore detailed examination of other
platforms and missions while the perception that it would
set fleetwide qualification standards is questionable.
A single exam would focus on a narrow set of topics
applicable across all platforms and missions. For the
survey, this exam alternative was defined to include warfare
skills, tactics, systems and capabilities while covering
only the basics of engineering, damage control, administra-
tion and repair. The advantage of this structure is that it
would more likely be perceived to set minimum qualification
standards because it covers the entire fleet. The
disadvantage is that its structure would not examine, in
detail, broad areas of surface warfare that are equally
critical to SWO competency.
The null hypothesis states that a multiple-versioned
exam which accounted for the variety of platforms and
mission areas would not be preferable to a single exam
focused on a narrowed field of topics. Each structure was
explained in detail on the survey.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Survey construction was completed following the
identification of relevant issues, development of hypotheses
and identification of other factors relevant to the
research. The survey was divided into four areas. Section
A covers career path specialization. Section B covers
career path specialization with regard to readiness
considerations, SWO tour length and rotation, and officer
professional attributes. Section C covers SWO qualification
and training. Section D covers the demographics of the
sample group relevant to the research.
Appendix A is a copy of the survey as distributed to the
respondents. Each numbered question is an item and
henceforth will be referred to by item number. The survey
is composed of two item types. The first item type are
ordinal scales and require that the respondent mark one or
more answers as specified by the directions. These items
are primarily contained in Section D. Examples of this type
are Items 40 and 44.
The second item type are statements that respondents are
instructed to respond to using a seven-point Likert scale.
The seven-point scale assumes an equal interval continuum
from 1 (very low/strongly disagree) to 7 (very high/strongly
agree) . The 4-digit of the scale represents a neutral or
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moderate position. This scaling technique is simple, easily
manipulated, powerful and is best suited to applications
where attitudinal or issue position measurement is required.
Following survey construction, a pilot study was
completed. The purpose of the pilot study was to evaluate
the mechanics of the survey, check for biases, and ensure
that the content of the survey was complete. Each member of
the pilot study group completed a survey, completed an
attached questionnaire, and was interviewed. Pilot study
subjects were picked from a range of demographic variables
assumed to be relevant to the population. The pilot study
indicated that survey content was complete and unbiased.
Minor re-wording of the directions and two items was
completed and the survey was released.
All SWOs attending the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
comprised the population. A survey was delivered to every
SWO assigned as a student to NPS except those newly arriving
students who had not been entered in the command's data base
with a valid student mail code. Of the 235 surveys
delivered, 154 were returned, and 153 surveys were entered
into the data base constructed for the analysis. One survey
was rejected because it was not sufficiently completed. The
valid response rate was in excess of 65% of the entire
population. Survey data entry was completed in a fixed
record length format and random cases were screened for
accuracy. No errors were found.
Generalizing the analysis to the entire community is not
a goal of the research because it was not possible to
acquire the data neccessary to statistically compare the
distribution of the NPS SWO's to the distribution of SWO's
in the community. Other organizations better possess the
resources and data base access required to accomplish this.
It is assumed, therefore, that the distribution of NPS SWO's
does not closely approximate that of the entire SWO
community in several respects. Senior officers, very junior
officers and active duty reservists are not represented.
Surface warfare officers with amphibious warfare, nuclear
power and combat logistics force backgrounds are most likely
under-represented. The value of the research should be
viewed from the perspective of presenting relevant and
possibly fresh insight into officer career path issues and
readiness through the perceptions of the officers most
effected by the issues examined.
The issues examined pertain entirely to the division
officer and department head career time frame for the
majority of SWO's who follow the standard SWO career path.
The survey group is composed almost entirely of post
division officer and post department head SWO's. Therefore
respondents well represent the cross section of the
community most directly affected by the issues which are the
subject of the research. The post department head officers
bring to the survey the perspectives of current department
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head experience while the post division officer SWO's bring
to the survey current division officer perceptions and the
perspectives of those who will soon be filling department
head assignments.
The breakdown of the sample group by years of
commissioned active duty (Item 41) is presented in Table 1.
TABLE 1








The majority of respondents, 90.8%, have between four
and 12 years commissioned active duty. These are the mid-
grade years in which most SWO's complete division officer
touring and subsequently complete department head tours.
The breakdown of the sample group by most recent sea
assignment (Item 47) was that 63.4% of the repondents had
most recently been to sea as division officers, 26.8% as
department heads and 9.8% as executive officers or sea-going








had been in division officer or department head billets
closely approximates the proportion of respondents (90.8%)
with four to 12 years active duty. The breakdown by rank
(Item 40) also illustrates the heavy representation within
the sample group of mid-grade SWO's. Lieutenants and
lieutenant-commanders comprise 98% of those who responded.
Demographic breakdown of the respondents across these
variables confirms that the survey population is primarily
composed of those officers for which the survey and its
analysis were intended.
Table 2 summarizes the cumulative ship type assignment
experience as division officers (Item 44) and, if
applicable, as department heads (Item 45) . Its purpose is
to illustrate the preponderence of combatant tour experience
of both division officers and department heads.
CUMULATIVE DIVISION OFFICER AND DEPARTMENT
HEAD ASSIGNMENT EXPERIENCE
Division officer Department head
Ship type tours tours
amphibious 15 8
attack carrier 16 2
combat logistics 13 6
surface combatant 151 55
other 10* 10*
* MSO, ARS, ASR, PHM, AGF, AS, AD, AR, afloat staff
Of more importance to the analysis is the determination
of how specialized the respondents perceive themselves to
be. Table 3 presents the breakdown of repondent perceived
specialization by warfare area (Item 2) . They were asked to
classify themselves as specialists in one of three warfare
areas or classify themselves as strictly generalists.
TABLE 3














The majority of respondents perceive themselves to be
specialized, particularly in combatant warfare. Actual tour
experience as shown in Table 2 substantiates these percep-
tions. The ratios of perceived specialization by warfare
area from Table 3 and the ratios of assignment experience by
ship type from Table 2 do not reasonably approximate the
composition of the fleet by ship type. The approximate
ratios of combatatants to amphibious ships and combat
logistics ships is approximately 5:2:1 respectively.
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Therefore specialization within the sample group differs
significantly from that which would be expected from the
community as a whole.
Repondents were then asked if they perceived themselves
to be specialized by department (Item 3) . Table 4 presents
the breakdown of perceived specialization by department.
TABLE 4
PERCEIVED SPECIALIZATION BY DEPARTMENT
Area Frequency Percent




strictly a generalist 32
153 100.0
Almost 80% believed themselves to be specialized in a
departmental area. Tables 3 and 4 indicate respondents
perceive themselves to be highly specialized by both warfare
area and department. Only 20.9% of the respondents believed
they were generalists in one or both areas. Thirteen
respondents (8.5%) indicated they were generalized by both
department and warfare area while 51 repondents (33.3%)
indicated they were generalized by either department or






(58.2%) considered themselves to be specialized by both
department and warfare area.
Univariate statistics were computed for the variables in
Sections A through C. In addition to the calculations of
means, medians and standard deviations, histograms were
plotted. The purpose was to get preliminary impressions of
the data and decide how the analysis was to proceed.
Correlation matrices were computed to examine other,
possibly relevant, variable relationships not included in
the hypothesis tests. Univariate analysis revealed that
some distributions were highly skewed while in others,
response data was almost uniformly distributed.
Scatterplots were constructed for all relevant variable
pairings including those variables which were shown to have
a significant positive or negative correlation. Analysis of
Univariate statistics and examination of scatterplots
indicated that matched pairing analysis was probably the
most appropriate choice of analysis methods because many
significant relationships shown in scatterplot examination
could best be described deterministically through related
samples analysis of perceptual differences. Items 6 and 7
are examples of this item type.
The distributions of most variables indicated that
related samples analysis was the most appropriate
methodology for hypothesis testing. Variable central
values, means and medians, were very similar while variances
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tended to be large. Appendix B presents a few of the
variable univariate statistics as examples. Due to the
subject-to-subject variability, these distributions tended
to mask significant information that was readily apparent
from examination of scatterplots. By matching responses to
individuals the extraneous influences of the subject-to-
subject variability was reduced. Therefore the significant
relationships previously masked became more readily apparent
while the distributions of differences more closely
approximated normal distributions.
Statistics derived from sample pairing examine
differences in responses for matched pairs and then
determine if the observed differences are statistically
significant. The most useful statistical tools for related
samples hypothesis testing are the parametric paired t-test
and its non-parametric equivalent, the Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks test (WMST) . Both statistics were
implemented in the analysis to give a clear and
understandable interpretation to the widest range of
readers.
Responses from the variables being tested from each
respondent form the pairing scheme for hypothesis testing.
The computed difference between response values for an
individual is a case. The paired t-test requires that
differences between matched responses must be measurable on
at least an interval scale. The second requirement is that
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these computed differences for all cases must be close to
normally distributed. If these requirements are met, the
sample mean of the differences, "d~, and the sample standard
deviation of the differences, d/ can be calculated and the
paired t-statistic may be formed.
To calculate the paired t-statistic for matched pairs
the difference variable, D, is determined for each case
D = Ra - Rb
where Ra is the Likert scale value for variable a and Rb is
the Likert scale value for variable b. Now d and o d can be
calculated and the t-statistic formed. If there is not a
statistically significant difference between D and a
hypothetical mean of 0, the null hypothesis that there is no
difference is accepted, otherwise the null hypothesis is
rejected indicating a real difference is present. The
equation for the paired t-statistic is
d -
o dAn





--^» /n [Ref. 9:p. 270].
Because the direction of the relationships could not be
specified prior to analysis a two-tailed observed
significance level, p, was used. The rejection criteria
chosen for the hypothesis testing was the .05 significance
level
.
The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (WMST) is a
non-parametric procedure used for comparing paired samples
to test the hypothesis that the distributions of Ra and Rb
are the same. This procedure is based on the magnitudes and
the directions of the differences and does not require any
prior assumptions about the shape of the distributions only
that it must be possible to rank the differences. This
requirement is met by interval scaling. The null hypothesis
essentially states that the difference of the sums of
positive and negative ranks is equal to 0.
To implement this test the variable D is calculated for
each case. The differences are then ranked ignoring the
sign of the difference. If two or more differences are the
same, the average rank for them is used. Now the rankings
are multiplied by their respective signs and the sums of the
positive and the negative ranks are determined. The
statistic T is the smaller of the positive and negative rank
sums. For large sample sizes the normal approximation for
the distribution of T may be used where
T
Z = —
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Since T is not dependent on the magnitude of the
differences but only on their ranks, a prior distribution
need not be specified. Thus the test is non-parametric.
The observed significance level, p, corresponding to the
calculated Z value for a two-tailed standard normal
distribution is extracted and the decision to reject or
accept is made.
For large sample sizes, the t distribution closely
approximates the normal distribution. Samples sizes were
universally greater than 145, therefore the normal
approximation of the WMST is an eguivalent measure to the t-
statistic. The observed significance level, p, is the
probability that a difference at least as large as the one
observed would have arisen if the means were really egual.
A two-tailed probability was used because the direction of
the test could not be specified prior to analysis. The
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rejection criteria chosen for comparison with the p-value
was the .05 significance level.
While the parametric paired t-test is generally the more
efficient and more familiar test, the WMST was included in
the analysis for two reasons. Together, the paired t-test
and the WMST give the reader two statistics that measure the
same relationships but are computed in different ways with
differing prior assumptions. Second, the statistical
package chosen for the analysis, SPSS-X, also determines the
numbers of positive and negative differences and the numbers
of cases where the differences were 0, denoted as ties, for
the WMST. This gives the reader a third measure with which
to evaluate the significance of the relationships.
IV. HYPOTHESIS TEST RESULTS
A. LISTING OF HYPOTHESIS TEST RESULTS
1. Hypothesis 1
The hypothesis tests the perception that respondents
believe each of the specialization approaches are as equally
beneficial to the Navy as they are compatible with their
career aspirations. Table 5 summarizes the results.
The hypothesis was accepted for the departmental
specialization approach. Respondents believe departmental
specialization would be as beneficial to the Navy as it
would be compatible with career aspirations. If the null
hypothesis is true, there is a .59 probability for the t-
statistic and a .63 probability for the WMST Z-statistic of
obtaining test statistic values at least as extreme as those
observed. The null hypothesis was also accepted for the
warfare area specialization approach. Respondents believe
warfare area specialization would be as beneficial to the
Navy as it would be compatible with career aspirations. If
the null hypothesis is true, there is a .11 probability for
the t-statistic and a .12 probability for the WMST Z-
statistic of obtaining test statistic values at least as
extreme as those observed.
The hypothesis was rejected for the separate
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separate engineering career path proposal would be
significantly more beneficial to the Navy then it would be
compatible with career aspirations. The probability of
falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for both test
statistics is less than .001. Sixty-one respondents (mean
rank = 37.96) indicated a stronger belief that the benefit
to the Navy would be greater while 12 (mean rank = 32.13)
believed the converse to be true.
2 . Hypothesis 2
The objective of the test was to determine which
specialization approach was perceived to be the most
beneficial to the Navy. Table 6 summarizes the results.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
the departmental approach with the warfare area approach.
Respondents believe departmental specialization would be
significantly more beneficial to the Navy than warfare area
specialization. The probability of falsely rejecting the
null hypothesis is .01 for the t-statistic and .02 for WMST
Z-statistic. Sixty respondents (mean rank = 52.67) ranked
departmental specialization higher than warfare area
specialization while 39 respondents (mean rank = 45.90)
believed the converse to be true.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
departmental specialization with the separate engineering
career path approach. Respondents believe departmental
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Navy than the separate engineering career path approach.
The probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for
both test statistics is less than .01. Sixty-three
respondents (mean rank = 53.31) ranked the department
approach higher while 36 (mean rank = 44.21) ranked the
separate engineering approach higher.
The hypothesis was accepted for the comparison of
the warfare area approach and the separate engineering
career path approach. Respondents believe warfare area
specialization would be as beneficial to the Navy as the
separate engineering career path approach. If the null
hypothesis is true, there is a .46 probability for the t-
statistic and a .48 probability for the WMST Z-statistic of
obtaining test statistic values at least as extreme as those
observed.
The perceptualized benefit to the Navy was ranked
highest for specialization by department followed by warfare
area specialization and the separate engineering career path
approach.
3 . Hypothesis 3
The objective of the test was to determine which
specialization approach was perceived to be most compatible
with officer career aspirations. Table 7 summarizes the
results
.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
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believe departmental specialization would be significantly
more compatible with career aspirations. The probability of
falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for both test
statistics is less than .001. Sixty-six respondents (mean
rank = 53.48) ranked departmental specialization higher
while 3 6 respondents (mean rank = 47.86) ranked warfare area
higher.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
departmental specialization with the separate engineering
career path approach. Respondents believe that departmental
specialization would be significantly more compatible with
career aspirations and they believe the separate engineering
career path approach is incompatible with career aspirations
(the sample mean was less than 4.00). The probability of
falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for both test
statistics is less than .001. Eighty-seven respondents
(mean rank = 63.07) ranked departmental specialization
higher while 30 (mean rank = 47.18) ranked the separate
engineering career path higher.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
warfare area specialization and the separate engineering
career path approach. Respondents believe warfare area
specialization would be more compatible with aspirations.
The probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for
both test statistics is less than .01. Seventy-two
respondents (mean rank = 64.36) ranked warfare area
specialization higher and 45 respondents (mean rank = 50.42)
ranked the separarate engineering career path higher.
Respondents ranked departmental specialization
highest in compatibility with career aspirations followed by
warfare area specialization. The separate engineering
career path proposal was perceived to be incompatible with
career aspirations.
4 . Hypothesis 4
The null hypothesis essentially states that, for the
division officer and the department head, managerial and
technical competencies are equally important attributes.
Table 8 summarizes the results.
For the comparisons of criticality to job
performance the hypothesis was rejected. Respondents
believe managerial competency and technical competency are
more critical to the job performance of the department head.
The probability of falsely rejecting the null hypotheses for
both test statistics is less than .001. Sixty-nine
respondents (mean rank = 39.12) indicated managerial
competency was more critical to the department head than to
the division officer while nine respondents (mean rank =
42.44) indicated the converse perception. Seventy-three
respondents (mean rank = 47.24) indicated technical
competency was more critical to a department head's job
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while 19 (mean rank = 43.66) indicated the converse to be
true.
For the comparisons of contribution to ship's
readiness the hypothesis was rejected. Respondents believe
department head managerial and technical competencies are
more contributory to ship's readiness than are those of the
division officer. The probability of falsely rejecting the
null hypotheses for both test statistics is less than .001.
Respondents indicated that department head technical
competency contributed more to ship's readiness in 65 cases
(mean rank = 43.12) while 17 respondents (mean rank = 35.32)
indicated the division officer's contribution was greater.
With regard to managerial competency, 79 respondents (mean
rank = 42.45) indicated the department head's contribution
to ship's readiness was greater than that of the division
officer's while five respondents (mean rank = 43.30)
indicated the converse to be true.
In addition to rating the above competencies,
respondents were also asked to rate the importance of
leadership skills and tactical/watchstanding skills.
Respondents perceived each of these attributes to be
significantly more important to the department head in both
criticality to job performance and contribution to ship's
readiness. The probability of falsely rejecting the null
hypotheses for both test statistics is less than .001.
However, these results are not critical to the hypothesis
test so are not included in Table 8.
5 . Hypothesis 5
The objective of the test was to rank order the
perceptions of the four professional attributes of the
department head with regard to their contribution to ship's
readiness. Table 9 summarizes the results.
The hypothesis was accepted for the comparison of
leadership skills with managerial competency. Respondents
believe leadership skills are as contributory to ship's
readiness then is managerial competency. If the null
hypothesis is true, there is a .11 probability for the t-
statistic and a .23 probability for the WMST Z-statistic of
obtaining test statistic values at least as extreme as those
observed.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
leadership skills with technical competency. Respondents
believe leadership skills are significantly more
contributory to ship's readiness then is technical
competency. The probability of falsely rejecting the null
hypothesis for both test statistics is less than .001.
Eighty-seven respondents (mean rank = 52.30) indicated
leadership skills contributed more than technical competency
while 15 respondents (mean rank = 46.87) indicated the
converse to be true.
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The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
tactical/watchstanding skills with technical competency.
Respondents believe tactical/watchstanding skills are
significantly more contributory to ship's readiness then is
technical competency. The probability of falsely rejecting
the null hypothesis for both test statistics is less than
.001. Eighty-nine respondents (mean rank = 52.41) indicated
leadership skills contributed more to ship's readiness than
did technical competency while 13 (mean rank = 45.19)
indicated the converse to be true.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
managerial competency with technical competency. Respon-
dents believe managerial competency is significantly more
contributory to ship's readiness then is technical
competency. The probability of falsely rejecting the null
hypothesis for both test statistics is less than .001.
Eighty-two respondents (mean rank = 51.74) indicated
managerial competency contributed more to ship's readiness
than did technical competency while 17 (mean rank = 41.62)
indicated the converse to be true.
Finally, the hypothesis was accepted for the
comparison of tactical/watchstanding skills with managerial
competency. Respondents believe tactical/watchstanding
skills are as contributory to ship's readiness as is
managerial competency. If the null hypothesis is true,
there is a .11 probability for the t-statistic and a .13
probability for the WMST Z-statistic of obtaining test
statistic values at least as extreme as those observed.
For leadership skills, tactical/watchstanding skills
and managerial competency, the perception that these
attributes of the department head contribute equally to
ship's readiness must be accepted while technical competency
is perceived to be significantly less contributory to ship's
readiness.
6 . Hypothesis 6
The objective of the test was to determine if each
of the department head professional attributes contribute as
strongly to ship's readiness as they are critical to job
performance. Table 10 summarizes the results.
For leadership skills the hypothesis was accepted.
Respondents believe leadership skills are as contributory to
ship's readiness as they are critical to job performance.
If the null hypothesis is true, there is a .08 probability
for the t-statistic and a .10 probability for the WMST Z-
statistic of obtaining test statistic values at least as
extreme as those observed.
For tactical/watchstanding skills, the equality
hypothesis was rejected. Respondents believe tactical/
watchstanding skills are significantly more contributory to
ship's readiness then they are critical to job performance.
The probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for
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respondents (mean rank = 22.07) indicated this attribute
contributed more strongly to ship's readiness while nine
respondents (mean rank = 2 6.72) believed the attribute was
more critical to job performance.
For technical competency, the hypothesis was
accepted. Respondents believe this attribute is as
contributory to ship's readiness as it is critical to job
performance. If the null hypothesis is true, there is a .39
probability for the t-statistic and a .35 probability for
the WMST Z-statistic of obtaining test statistic values at
least as extreme as those observed.
For managerial competency, the hypothesis was
accepted. Respondents believe managerial competency is as
contributory to ship's readiness as it is critical to job
performance. If the null hypothesis is true, there is a .10
probability for the t-statistic and a .20 probability for
the WMST Z-statistic of obtaining test statistic values at
least as extreme as those observed.
Except for tactical/watchstanding skills, which were
perceived to contribute more to ship's readiness than they
were critical to job performance, the null hypothesis for
each comparison was accepted. For a department head,
respondents believe leadership skills, managerial conpetency
and technical competency contribute as strongly to ship's
readiness as they are critical to job performance.
7
. Hypothesis 7
The null hypothesis states that, if implemented at
the department head level, a specialization policy would
equally benefit combat, material and fleet readiness. Table
11 summarizes the results.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
fleet readiness with material readiness. Respondents
believe the policy would benefit material readiness more
then it would benefit fleet readiness. The probability of
falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for both test
statistics is less than .001. Fifty-one respondents (mean
rank = 32.91) expressed a stronger belief that material
readiness would be improved relative to that of fleet
readiness while 14 respondents (mean rank = 33.32) believed
the converse to be true.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
fleet readiness with combat readiness. Respondents believe
specialization policy would benefit combat readiness more
then it would benefit fleet readiness. The probability of
falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for both test
statistics is less than .001. Fifty respondents (mean rank
= 31.73) ranked higher the perception that combat readiness
would be improved while 13 respondents (mean rank = 33.04)
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The hypothesis was accepted for the comparison of
combat readiness with material readiness. Respondents
believe the policy would equally benefit combat and material
readinesses. If the null hypothesis is true, there is a .87
probability for the t-statistic and a .73 probability for
the WMST Z-statistic of obtaining test statistic values at
least as extreme as those observed.
Respondents perceived that implementation of a
department head specialization policy would result in
significantly higher levels of combat and material
readinesses. With regard to fleet readiness, respondents
perceived either the impact of specialization would be less
significant or they were unsure of any impact.
8 . Hypothesis 8
The hypothesis tests the perception of the impact on
readiness of a single 3 month department head tour compared
to split 18 month tours. Table 12 summarizes the results.
The hypothesis was accepted for the comparison of
material readiness with combat readiness. Respondents
believe the single tour would promote higher and equally
significant levels of material and combat readinesses. If
the null hypothesis is true, there is a .29 probability for
the t-statistic and a .38 probability for the WMST Z-
statistic of obtaining test statistic values at least as








tr rH fr tr CP
C •H •H
•H 10 w w
r-l -
a -h (U QJ Q)
O (T3 p p — P
4J H O H O
U 8 O ~ gg O S•H +j M H M »- M O
rH (0 aij <x ftU
& s Pn wW
-o — TJ W T3
rH Q) rH WO ij
^ a!
d w 3 C 3 (/)




? QJ 2» TJ * C
c rd H
M-H M 0) *h
-d
rH O
3 XJ 3 H 3 id
o (d O O 0)
a
P Q) P .H +J M
S»
M id







ai KD t-. •* VO VD in O H n
w CM r^ n o O CO
fO H
u
n o\ O CO CN HCM in VO 1 o in 1 in CO 1
BJ q 1 I 1
Q) id cr. CN 1 in <n I r- r- 1
B u r> r> H CN (N n
M Eh £ Eh S En
£







H H 0) Eh 53 0) Eh SS 0)
tJ § -H H* O •H £ O •Htn P fn O -P U 4J
58
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
combat readiness with fleet readiness. Respondents believe
the benefits to combat readiness would be significantly
greater. The probability of falsely rejecting the null
hypothesis for both test statistics is less than .001.
Thirty-six respondents (mean rank = 22.58) expressed a
stronger belief that combat readiness would be significantly
benefitted relative to that of fleet readiness while 6
respondents (mean rank = 15.00) indicated the converse was
true.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
material readiness with fleet readiness. Respondents
believe the benefits to material readiness would be
significantly greater than those to fleet readiness. The
probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for
both test statistics is .01. Forty-six respondents (mean
rank = 39.53) expressed a stronger belief that material
readiness would be significantly benefitted while 27
respondents (mean rank = 32.69) indicated a stronger belief
that fleet readiness would be significantly benefitted.
Respondents perceived that the longer single tour
would tend to promote significantly higher levels of the
three readinesses, the median strength of perception for
each readiness was 5.00. For combat and material
readinesses, the differences in strength of the perceptions
were not statistically significant. They believe that the
59
benefits to each would be equal. The strength of the
perception was significantly less for fleet readiness.
Respondents were either unsure of the benefits to fleet
readiness or they believed the perceived benefits would be
less than the anticipated benefits to combat and material
readinesses.
9 . Hypothesis 9
The objective of the test was to determine if the
respondents believe implementation of the proposed
department head rotation system would significantly benefit
ship's deployed combat readiness (DCR) . Table 13 summarizes
the results.
The statement that implementation of the rotation
policy would significantly benefit DCR and the statement
that the policy would have little effect because ship's now
deploy as combat ready as is humanly possible were compared.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison. Respondents
believe that implementation would significantly increase
DCR. The probability of falsely rejecting the null
hypothesis for both test statistics is less than .001. One
hundred ten respondents (mean rank = 71.46) indicated a
stronger belief that implementation would benefit DCR while
20 respondents (mean rank = 31.75) indicated a stronger
belief that ship's now deploy as combat ready as is humanly
possible. The median values of the variables were 6.00 and
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implementation would significantly benefit DCR but also that
ship's do not now deploy as combat ready as is humanly
possible.
The statement that implementation would
significantly benefit DCR and the statement that
implementation would have little effect because DCR is not
department head dependent were compared. The hypothesis was
rejected for the comparison. Respondents believe that
implementation of the rotation policy would result in
significant gains to DCR. The probability of falsely
rejecting the null hypothesis for both statistics is less
than .001. One hundred eleven respondents (mean rank =
71.47) indicated a stronger belief that implementation would
benefit DCR while 22 (mean rank = 44.45) indicated a
stronger belief that implementation would have no
significant effect. The median values of the variables were
6.00 and 3.00, respectively. Not only did the respondents
believe implementation would significantly benefit DCR but
also that DCR is to a measurable extent department head
dependent.
Respondents believed that deployed combat readiness
is, at least partially, department head dependent and they
overwhelmingly believed implementation of a detailing policy
to provide department head continuity through the work-up




The objective of the test was to determine if
respondents believe the rotation proposal would have to be
expanded beyond the department head level to significantly
benefit deployed combat readiness (DCR) . Table 14
summarizes the results.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison that
the proposal would have to be expanded beyond the department
level to significantly impact DCR against the proposal would
significantly increase DCR. Respondents believe the
rotation proposal would not have to be expanded to realize
significant DCR gains. The probability of falsely rejecting
the null hypothesis for both test statistics is less than
.001. Sixty-six respondents (mean rank = 56.25) indicated a
stronger belief that the proposal would significantly
increase DCR while 36 respondents (mean rank = 42.79)
indicated a stronger belief that the proposal would have to
be expanded beyond the department head level to impact DCR.
11. Hypothesis 11
The null hypothesis states that SWO PQS serves
equally as: a tool the prospective SWO uses to gain
background warfare experience, a sufficient fleetwide
standard for the minimum level of warfare qualification
required of a SWO, a flexible tool individual commands adapt
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to document qualification progress. Table 15 summarizes the
results.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparisons of
the statement that SWO PQS is primarily a learning tool to
gain warfare background experience against the statements
that it is a sufficient standard for warfare qualification,
it is a flexible tool which commands adapt to suit their SWO
qualification requirements, and it primarily serves as a
tool to document SWO qualification progress. For each
comparison, significantly more respondents indicated a
stronger belief that PQS was primarily a learning tool to
gain background warfare experience. The probability of
rejecting the null hypotheses for both test statistics is
less than .001.
The hypothesis was accepted for the comparison of
SWO PQS as a sufficient qualification standard against SWO
PQS as primarily a flexible tool which commands adapt to
suit their qualification requirements. Respondents believe
PQS serves both purposes equally. If the null hypothesis is
true, there is a .14 probability for the t-statistic and a
.13 probability for the WMST Z-statistic of obtaining test
statistic values at least as extreme as those observed.
The hypothesis was accepted for the comparison of
SWO PQS as a sufficient qualification standard against SWO
PQS as primarily providing documentation to chart
qualification progress. Respondents believe PQS serves both
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purposes equally. If the null hypothesis is true, there is
a .08 probability for the t-statistic and a .09 probability
for the WMST Z-statistic of obtaining test statistic values
at least as extreme as those observed.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
SWO PQS as primarily a command's flexible tool against SWO
PQS as primarily providing qualification documentation. The
probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for
both test statistics is less than .001. Significantly more
respondents indicated stronger agreement with the flexible
tool statement than with the qualification documentation
statement.
Of the four comparisons, respondents overwhelmingly
perceived SWO PQS to be, primarily, a learning tool used to
gain warfare background experience. It cannot be inferred
that SWO PQS does not serve the other purposes examined,
just that they are not the system's primary value.
12 . Hypothesis 12
The objective of the test was to compare the
perceived adequacy of the SWO qualification system in
meeting the minimum criteria the fleet requires with the
adequacy of the qualification system in setting satisfactory
standards of performance and expertise required to obtain
SWO qualification. Table 16 summarizes the results.
The hypothesis test was not completed for the
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satisfactory performance and expertise standards variable.
The distribution of paired response data was strongly
bimodal. Responses were highly correlated (r = .634) and
polarized indicating respondents tended to either strongly
agree with both statements or strongly disagree with both.
In this instance, hypothesis testing the equality of the
differences of means is meaningless.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparisons that
fleetwide standardization of requirements for SWO qualifica-
tion is a relevant issue with the minimum qualification
criteria the fleet requires variable and the sufficient
performance and expertise standards variable. Respondents
believe more strongly in the relevancy of the issue than
they believe the system meets minimum fleet criteria and
sets sufficient performance and expertise standards. The
probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for
both test statistics is less than .001.
13 . Hypothesis 13
The objective of the test was to determine the
perception of which organizational levels were most
responsible for SWO warfare training. Table 17 summarizes
the results.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
the CO's responsibility with the Navy's responsibility for
warfare training. Respondents indicated significantly
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SWO warfare training as it is to other high-priority-
training programs. The probability of falsely rejecting the
null hypothesis for both test statistics is less than .001.
Sixty-seven respondents (mean rank = 40.35) indicated
stronger agreement with the Navy responsibility statement
while 12 (mean rank = 38.04) indicated stronger agreement
with the CO's responsibility statement.
The hypothesis was accepted for the comparison of
the CO's responsibility for warfare training and the
individual's responsibility for preparing himself to be a
warrior. Respondents believe the CO's responsibility for
training SWO ' s to be warriors relative to other officer
training priorities is egual to that of the individual's
responsibilty to not only do his job but also prepare
himself to be a warrior. If the null hypothesis is true,
there is a .97 probability for the t-statistic and a .70
probability for the WMST Z-statistic of obtaining test
statistic values at least as extreme as those observed.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
the Navy's responsibility for warfare training and the
individual's responsibility for preparing himself to be a
warrior. Respondents indicated significantly stronger
agreement that the Navy should be as dedicated to SWO
warfare training as it is to other high priority-training
programs. The probability of falsely rejecting the null
hypothesis for both test statistics is less than .001.
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Sixty-one respondents (mean rank = 50.25) indicated stronger
agreement with the Navy responsibility statement while 3
respondents (mean rank = 37.37) indicated stronger agreement
with the individual's responsibility statement.
The most organizationally polarized perception of
responsibility was tested. The hypothesis was rejected for
the comparison that the Navy should be as dedicated to SWO
warfare training as it is to other high-priority training
programs with SWO gualification as a personal goal to be
attained by the individual according to his own faculties
and not in a programmed locked-step mode. Respondents
indicated significantly stronger agreement that the Navy
should be as dedicated to SWO warfare training as it is to
other high-priority training programs. The probability of
falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for both test
statistics is less than .001. One hundred fourteen
respondents (mean rank = 68.22) indicated stronger
agreement with the Navy responsibility statement while 13
respondents (mean rank = 26.96) indicated stronger agreement
with the personal goal statement.
Finally, the hypothesis was rejected for the
comparison of individual's responsibility for preparing
himself to be a warrior with SWO qualification as a personal
goal to be attained by the individual according to his own
faculties and not in a programmed locked-step mode.
Respondents indicated significantly stronger agreement that
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it is primarily the individual's responsibility to not only
do his job but also prepare himself to be a warrior. The
probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for
both test statistics is less than .001. One hundred two
respondents (mean rank = 63.14) indicated stronger
agreement with the individual's responsibility statement
while 17 (mean rank = 41.15) indicated stronger agreement
with the personal goal statement. Respondents believe the
individual must be self-motivated, beyond the scope of his
day to day duties, to prepare himself to be a warrior and
that the path to gualification requires an organized formal
structure.
The strongest perception of responsibility for
warfare training was that the Navy should be as dedicated to
warfare training as it is to other high-priority programs.
14 . Hypothesis 14
The objective of the test was to determine if
respondents believe a SWO exam would set a minimum standard
for warfare qualification regardless of whether or not they
believe an adequate standard now exists. Table 18
summarizes the results.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
the present system meeting the minimum qualification
criteria the fleet requires against the proposed exam
setting a minimum standard for SWO qualification.
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set a minimum standard for warfare qualification. The
probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis for
both test statistics is .01. Seventy-one respondents (mean
rank = 63.77) indicated a stronger belief that an exam would
set a minimum standard. Forty-eight respondents (mean rank
= 54.43) indicated a stronger belief that the present system
meets the minimum fleet criteria required.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison of
the present qualification system setting sufficient
performance and expertise standards for qualification
against the proposed exam setting a minimum standard for SWO
qualification. Respondents believe more strongly that an
exam would better set a minimum standard for SWO
qualification. The probability of falsely rejecting the
null hypothesis for both test statistics is less than .001.
Ninety-six respondents (mean rank = 70.61) indicated a
stronger belief that an exam would set a minimum standard
while 35 (mean rank = 57.26) indicated a stronger belief
that the present system sets sufficient performance and
expertise standards for qualification.
The hypothesis was accepted for the comparison of
PQS as a sufficient minimum standard with an exam setting a
minimum standard. Respondents did not believe that an exam
would better set a minimum standard for SWO qualification.
If the null hypothesis is true, there is a .28 probability
for the t-statistic and a .23 probability for the WMST Z-
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statistic of obtaining test statistic values at least as
extreme as those observed.
Respondents perceive that an exam, administered as a
requirement for warfare qualification, would set a minimum
qualification standard regardless of whether or not they
believe the present qualification system sets adequate
minimum standards. In the last comparison, a statistically
significant difference in the strength of perception was not
present. Respondents believe as strongly that the exam
would set a minimum standard as they believe the PQS system




The objective of the hypothesis test was to
determine if respondents believe an exam would set a minimum
qualification standard or if they believe an exam would be
impractical. Respondents believe an exam is practical and
it could set a minimum qualification standard. Table 19
summarizes the results.
The hypothesis was rejected for the comparison. The
probability of falsely rejecting th null hypothesis for both
test statistics is .01. Seventy-seven respondents (mean
rank = 74.66) believe more strongly that an exam would set a
minimum qualification standard. Fifty-seven respondents



























The objective of the hypothesis test was to
determine if respondents expressed a preference for an exam
structured in multiple versions or a single exam covering a
narrowed topic area. Table 2 summarizes the results.
The hypothesis was accepted for the comparison of
the two proposed exam structures. Respondents did not
express a significant preference for either exam structure.
If the null hypothesis is true, there is a .50 probability
for the t-statistic and a .56 probability for the WMST Z-
statistic of obtaining test statistic values at least as








The traditional view that a surface warfare officer must
be expert in all areas of surface warfare appears to be
yielding to the complexity and technology of modern naval
warfare [Ref. l:p. 1] . The rationale that increasing
technology mandates implementation of career path
specialization is widely supported both officially and in
professional literature [Refs. 1,3,6]. It is believed that
greater officer technical expertise derived through
specialization is necessary if the surface warfare community
is to be adequately prepared to meet the threat now and in
the future.
Survey analysis suggests respondents are very aware of
the increased emphasis given to technical expertise and
specialization. The majority of respondents believe
development of technical expertise in a specific warfare
area is a prerequisite for a successful career in today's
Navy (Item 8). Analysis of demographic data indicates
respondents are heavily specialized by both warfare area and
department. However, they also strongly believe the best
CO ' s and XO ' s are generalists rather than specialists (Item
7). These apparently contradictory observations are a
result of the paradoxical nature of the SWO career path.
Respondents perceive that a specialist's skills and
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experience better serve a department head while a
generalist's skills and experience better serve an XO or CO.
Unless an effective transition is made from specialist to
generalist, today's technically expert and specialized
junior officers may not, in the future, find themselves to
be inadequately prepared to successfully function in
positions requiring a generalist's background.
The success of any specialization policy implementation
would depend heavily upon SWO policy acceptance. Of the
three frameworks for specialization, respondents perceived
departmental specialization to be significantly more
compatible with personal career aspirations and
significantly more beneficial to the Navy. The fact that
departmental specialization was the clearly preferred
alternative could be due to several factors. Tracking
officers by department may be perceived to be the most
effective functional division. A significant number of
respondents are now specialized by department as a result of
previous policy implementation so they may prefer to remain
with this alternative. Respondents may perceive that, if
they desire to also specialize by warfare area, it would be
less difficult to do so in a framework of departmental
specialization than specialize by department in a framework
of warfare area specialization. Finally, respondents may
believe the specialized skills and experience inherent to
each department can be more readily transferred across
warfare areas than warfare area skills and experience can be
transferred across departments.
Before conclusions can be made concerning officer
perceptions of department head specialization, the issue of
technical competency must be placed into proper perspective.
Respondents rated technical competency to be significantly
more important to the department head than to the division
officer with regard to both its contribution to ship's
readiness and its criticality to job performance. Thus the
emphasis to specialize at the department head level appears,
as perceived by respondents, to be justified. However, they
also believe leadership skills, tactical/watchstanding
skills and managerial competency are more important to the
department head. Therefore, respondents do not believe
officer technical competency justifies specialization due to
a perception that readiness has become more dependent on
technical expertise than other department head professional
attributes.
If the primary goal of mid-grade surface warfare officer
development is assumed to be increased ship's readiness then
career path policies should emphasize the development of
officer attributes which contribute most to ship's
readiness. While respondents indicated leadership skills,
managerial competency and technical competency are each as
critical to job performance as they are contributory to
ship's readiness, they believed tactical/watchstanding
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skills to be significantly more contributory to ship's
readiness than critical to job performance. Increased
emphasis on tactical and watchstanding skills in the
evaluation of officer performance may yield greater
readiness returns than specialization policy stressing
technical competence. This is assuming perceptions of
attribute criticality to job performance can be influenced
through performance evaluation.
Department head specialization policy designed to
increase readiness through increased officer technical
competency is widely endorsed both officially and in
professional journals. The surveyed officers endorse
specialization as evidenced by their sea assignment choices
and their perceptions of the degree to which they feel they
are specialized. However, respondents do not believe
technical competency issues mandate specialization.
The motivation to specialize is most likely not due to
any officer altruistic perceptions of professional
attributes. The observed degree to which respondents are
specialized by department and warfare area is more likely
due to preferences for experience continuity. Simply
stated, this is the result of decisions to seek assignments
in ship types and/or departments in which the officer has
significant prior experience and in which he believes he may
make the greatest contributions. This is not to say the
needs of the Navy have not at times required some SWO's with
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specific skills to serve in billets for which they have
significant prior experience.
Building officer support for specialization because
increased technical competency will lead to higher readiness
is an interesting professional debate but hardly a necessary
one. As long as career path policy is compatible with
officer preferences for continuity of experience, acceptance
of the policy can be expected. However, should assignment
policy be implemented, for example, which requires officers
to be assigned across warfare areas, community managers
should expect resistance from the community's officers
because this would be contrary to the officer assignment
preferences observed in the demographic anlysis.
Regardless of their motivations to specialize,
respondents believe readiness would, indeed, significantly
benefit from a policy of specialization implemented at the
first tour department head level. Specifically, benefits to
combat readiness and material readiness were most strongly
perceived while the expectation of improved fleetwide
readiness was positive but not as strong. Sampled officers
were unsure if specialization would tend to produce less
effective CO ' s and XO's (Item 26) even though they believed
the best CO ' s and XO's were general ists rather than
specialists
.
Analysis of the perceived impact on readiness of the
single long tour assignment versus split 18 month tours
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yielded similar results. Respondents believe the longer
single tour assignment would promote significantly higher
levels of combat readiness and material readiness while the
perceived impact on fleetwide readiness was positive but not
as strong. Respondents were undecided if the single long
tour would subject the officer to greater career risks (Item
27) . The belief that an officer assigned to a single long
tour assignment would be able to more fully develop
warfighting skills (Item 27) was not supported by survey
statistics. Arguments for expansion of the longer single
tour assignment policy are supported by SWO * s for readiness
considerations while the perceived uncertainty of other
possible benefits and risks indicates only a qualified
endorsement.
Expansion of the single long tour assignment policy may
significantly improve ship's readiness and would be readily
accepted by SWO ' s . A time continuity preference parallel to
the experience continuity effect may be present. Given no
incentive to do otherwise, SWO ' s may prefer a longer single
department head tour to split touring. Additionally, a
stronger preference for the single tour would probably occur
if SWO's believed split touring was likely to result in an
assignment across warfare areas. As with specialization,
tour length policy changes would be more readily accepted
and meet with greater success if officer preferences are
identified and effectively addressed.
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The current policy of rotating department heads in fixed
time intervals may be the most practical way to detail
officers from both the perspectives of SWOs and community
managers. However, this policy may not be adequately
supporting ship's deployed combat readiness. The proposal
to detail ships according to their schedules instead of
detailing department heads according to an arbitrary time
interval was strongly supported. Respondents believed that
implementation of the proposed rotation system would not
only tend to significantly increase ship's deployed combat
readiness but they also believed deployed combat readiness
is, to a significant extent, department head dependent.
Respondents did not believe the proposal would need to be
expanded beyond the department head level to realize
significant deployed combat readiness benefits. With regard
to officer retention, respondents were unsure of the
proposal's impact (Item 29).
The surface warfare community is often criticized
because many feel its qualification system does not
consistently produce officers who meet minimum personal
qualification standards and fleet requirements. While the
majority of respondents believed standardization of
qualification requirements is a relevant issue (Item 31)
,
they were strongly divided in their perceptions of the
qualification system's adequacy. They tended to believe the
system supports minimum fleet criteria and sufficient
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personal qualification standards or they believed the system
supports neither. The strongly bimodal clustering of paired
response data for hypothesis 12 did not yield meaningful
hypothesis test statistics. Qualification criteria required
by the fleet and personal qualification standards do not
adequately explain the strong perception of issue relevancy
for the majority of respondents. There may exist other
reasons why respondents believe the issue is relevant other
than those examined.
Because standardization of SWO qualification is a
relevant issue, the system component intended to provide a
fleetwide framework for qualification, the PQS system, must
be evaluated. The aggregate success or failure of the PQS
component is dependent upon its perceived purposes and its
implementation aboard ships. The strongest and most
significant perception of the value of SWO PQS is that it
provides the prospective SWO with a learning tool with which
to gain basic warfare background and experience. This
format is most widely accepted because as a learning tool it
is less sensitive to the effects of the system's dependency
on its implementation.
The perception that PQS is a sufficient fleetwide
qualification standard was not significantly different than
the perception that it is a flexible tool to be adapted to
the individual command's qualification requirements. These
perceptions represent the extremes in the level of PQS
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implementation variability. PQS implementation is too
inconsistent for it to be strongly perceived as a sufficient
qualification standard while its implementation is not
sufficiently flexible to be strongly perceived as
effectively supporting the individual command's specific
qualification requirements. The perceived multi-purposed
nature and implementation of SWO PQS most likely serves
neither purpose effectively.
Fleetwide examination of prospective SWO's as an
additional component of the qualification system was
supported in principle but not in method of implementation.
The majority of respondents believe an exam would set a
fleetwide minimum standard for SWO qualification. They also
believe the diversity of missions, platforms and subject
areas do not necessarily make a standardized exam
infeasible. These perceptions are shared regardless of
whether or not they believe minimum fleet criteria and
sufficient performance and expertise standards now exist.
However, when compared to the perceived sufficiency of PQS
in standardizing a fleetwide minimum qualification level,
the perception that an exam would serve to set such a
standard was not significantly different.
Exam implementation is a critical factor because SWO's
must believe the exam design and content adequately support
its intended purposes. Of the two alternative methods for
implementing the exam, respondents did not express a
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statistically significant preference for either a multi-
versioned exam or one limited in scope to warfare skills,
tactics, systems and capabilities. Respondents believed
that focusing an exam on a limited number of specific topics
to the exclusion of other fundamental aspects of surface
warfare was as disadvantageous as a multiple versioned exam
tailored to specific platforms and mission areas.
Respondents do not necessarily believe the present
framework of the gualification system is inadeguate. Prior
to analysis it was anticipated that if PQS was believed to
be an insufficient gualification standard than respondents
would strongly support an exam as a standard for gualifica-
tion. Respondents did not necessarily believe that PQS was
an insufficient standard anymore than they believed an exam
would be a sufficient standard (Table 18) . Hypothesis
testing revealed an exam was feasible (Table 19) but that
implementation was a critical concern (Table 20) . Therefore
it may be concluded that, like an exam, PQS implementation
as a gualif ication standard is the crucial issue and not its
framework.
The relative responsibility for SWO warfare training of
the three organizational levels generally believed to have
the greatest impact upon the guality of junior surface
warfare officers was evaluated. The purpose of this
analysis is not to determine perceived organizational
accountability for training SWO ' s to be warriors but to
89
determine perceptions of which levels should be allocating a
greater share of limited resources from competing priorities
to officer warfare training.
The strongest perception of responsibility for warfare
training with regard to competing priorities was that the
Navy should be more responsible. Respondents indicated the
Navy should place greater emphasis on officer warrior
training relative to other high-priority training programs.
While respondents strongly believe commanding officers and
the individual SWO must share a great measure of the
responsibility, they also believe the allocation of
resources to warfare training are more in line with
competing priorities. Respondents appear to believe CO's
have additional priorities related to other aspects of a
CO's responsibilities which place equally significant
demands on officer training. They also believe the
individual SWO s competing responsibilities to his ship and
its chain of command place great demands on the limited time
and effort resources he may allocate. Analysis of survey
results appear to indicate that the Navy may be the
organizational level most able to bear the opportunity cost
of greater resource allocation to officer warrior training.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this thesis is to provide an analysis
of Surface warfare officers' perceptions concerning officer
career path, assignment rotation, qualification, and related
readiness issues. To accomplish this, a survey of Naval
Postgraduate School SWO ' s was conducted. Although the
population sampled does not closely approximate the
distribution of SWOs in the community, it does represent the
cross section of the community most directly effected by the
issues which are the subject of the research. Survey
findings show:
Respondents are heavily specialized and they strongly
believe department head specialization enhances
readiness.
Respondents believe technical expertise is a
prerequisite for a successful career but do not believe
it mandates specialization.
Respondents believe the best COs and XOs are
generalists and not specialists.
Leadership skills, tactical/watchstanding skills, and
managerial skills are perceived to contribute more to
readiness than does technical competency.
Respondents believe longer single tours and rotation
policy designed to ensure department head continuity
throughout the work-up cycle and deployment would
enhance readiness.
SWO PQS is most strongly perceived to be a learning
tool followed by the perception that it serves equally
as a standard for SWO qualification and as a flexible
tool commands adapt to suit their qualification
requirements
.
Respondents believe the Navy is the organizational
level most able to bear the opportunity cost of
increased SWO warfare training.
Respondents believe a qualification exam could better
set an adequate standard for qualification than does
the current qualification system but do not believe it
could better set a standard for qualification than
could SWO PQS.
Respondents did not express a preference for either a
multiple-versioned exam or a single generalized exam.
Analysis and interpretation of survey results yielded
the following conclusions. Officer preferences for
experience and time continuity appear to be the basis of
support for the specialization policy because survey results
indicate:
Strong preferences for specialization can be inferred
from demographic data analysis of respondent assignment
histories.
Specialization is strongly supported but not because
technical competency mandates it.
Specialization is strongly compatible with career
aspirations.
Respondents indicated the best CO ' s and XO's are generalists
and that specific warfare area technical expertise is
critical to career success. Therefore, junior officers may
find themselves to be inadequately prepared for future
assignments unless the effective transition from specialist
to generalist can be accomplished.
Survey results indicate that tactical and watchstanding
skills are believed to be significantly more contributory to
readiness than they are critical to job performance.
Therefore, increased emphasis on these skills in the
evaluation of department performance may yield corresponding
increases in readiness.
Data analysis revealed that the adequacy of the
qualification system as a standard for qualification does
not explain why respondents believe qualification
requirements are a relevant issue. There may exist other
reasons that can better explain the perception of issue
relevancy.
SWO PQS, as a personal learning tool, was perceived to
be its primary value. As a personal learning tool, its
value is only relevant to how the individual uses it and not
how it is implemented fleetwide. The fleetwide variability
in PQS implementation and not its content can explain why
survey results indicate that it is not strongly perceived to
be an effective qualification standard or a flexible tool to
be adapted to suit individual command's qualification
requirements. PQS implementation is too inconsistent for it
to be strongly perceived as a sufficient qualification
standard while its implementation is not sufficiently
flexible to be strongly perceived as effectively supporting
the individual command's qualification requirements.
Survey results indicate that an exam could set an
adequate qualification standard. Results also indicate its
perceived sufficiency as a qualification standard was not
significantly different than that observed for PQS.
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However, results show that respondents did not perceive
either exam structure to be an adequate implementation for
the exam proposal. The critical issue in the establishment
of adequate qualification standards is implementation and
not whether an exam or existing policy is the best format.
The recommendations which follow are based solely on
conclusions drawn from the analysis of the sampled officers'
perceptions concerning the issues examined.
The restructured SWO career path, the goal of which was
to enhance readiness through the specialization of
department heads, was strongly endorsed by respondents.
However, policy makers need to re-evaluate assumptions
concerning the role of professional skills and competencies.
In particular, policy emphasizing increased tactical and
watchstanding skills in the evaluation of department head
performance may yield significant readiness returns, and
would not be dependent on the ability of the detailing
system to support its implementation.
Expanding the number of single long tour department head
billets available to SWOs may significantly benefit
readiness and would be widely accepted within the community.
It is recommended that the feasibility of such a policy be
studied and appropriate assignment decision aids be
identified.
It is recommended that the feasibility of assignment
rotation policy designed to ensure department head
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continuity throughout the work-up cycle and deployment be
evaluated as a replacement to the current fixed time
interval department head rotation policy. If it is found to
be practical, decision aids should be identified which can
effectively support policy implementation.
A review of SWO training and qualification program
implementation and requirements is recommended. The focus
of the review should be the identification of policy
revisions that would better support uniform personal and
fleet minimum qualification standards while continuing to
allow individual commands some measure of flexibility in
establishing qualification requirements. However, community
managers can only provide the policy to implement this. It
is ultimately the responsibility of the communities officers
who must set and maintain the qualification standards they
perceive to be necessary.
From this analysis, it is concluded that the
incorporation of SWOs ' perceptions during policy formulation
as an input to decision making may yield more effective
policy. If officer support of policy is believed to
contribute to policy success, then comprehensive systematic
analysis of officer perceptions should be required during
the formulation of officer career path policies. These
analyses need not be complex statistical machinations.
However, they must completely address all relevant aspects
and alternatives of proposed policy from both the Navy
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organizational perspective and from the perspective of the
individual SWO. Analyses must also be timely and undertaken




The following is a copy of the survey released to NPS
SWOs.
SECTION A
Questions 1 thru 24 concern your perceptions of SWO
specialization. For the purposes of this questionnaire, a
specialist is a SWO who feels he has expertise in a specific
warfare sub-area of the community over and above all others.
For example, if a SWO had served entirely on amphibious
ships he might consider himself a specialist or if a SWO had
served tours in the operations departments on a CG, an LHA
and an FF he might consider himself an operations
specialist. A generalist would consider himself, more or
less, equally proficient in all warfare areas of the
community. Specialist, here, does not pertain to any "sub-
specialty" or "p-code" related aspects of the Navy.
For questions 1 thru 3 please mark only one response for
each question.
1. Which statement most applies to you?
_
I consider myself a SWO, first and foremost.
_
I am primarily a SWO and secondarily a Naval Officer
_
I am an equal balance of both.
_
I am primarily a Naval Officer and secondarily a SWO.
_
I consider myself a Naval Officer, first and
foremost.





















Indicate the degree of expertise and the level of
experience you feel you possess in each of the following
areas. Respond to all blocks of each question using the

















5. In reference to your past operational sea assignments,
evaluate the influence and accuracy each of the
following information sources had on your decision to
seek or accept those assignments. Respond using the
following 7 point scale:0123456 7














Rate the following SWO specialization approaches. Fir
evaluate them according to your personal career
aspirations and then assess them in relation to their
benefit to the Navy. Respond to all blocks for each













incorporating Ops, Combat Syst.,
and Engineering as the specialty
tracks.
Specialization by warfare area
incorporating Amphibs/CLF/Mine
Warfare as one track and
ASW/ASUW/AAW as the second.
Specialization in which engineers
and material specialists would have
a separate career path without the
opportunity for command at sea but
could obtain equivalent advancement
and promotion through an expanded
EDO program. All other SWO's would
follow the traditional career path
through command at sea.
For questions 7 thru 9 respond to each block of each





The best CO ' s and XO's are generalists rather than
specialists.
A SWO must become a technical expert in a warfare
area (weapons, operations, engineering etc.) to be
successful in today's Navy.
12 3 4 5 6 7
strongly uncertain strongly
disagree agree
If specialization were a policy requirement, the SWO
should declare his "track" intention (respond to each)
:
at the completion of his first division officer tour.
at the completion of his second division officer
tour.
_
prior to department head school.
at the time he receives his warfare device.
Rate the following assignments. First rate them according
to your perception of their contribution to a successful SWO
career then assess the desirability of each. Respond to all







b. combat systems officer
c. weapons officer
d. first Lt. amphibious
e. first Lt. CLF
f. ops officer amphibious
g. ops officer DD/FF/CG ___
h. ship control officer
i. weapons control officer
j . squadron staff
11. flag aide














This section, questions 25 thru 30, concerns a few
aspects of readiness. Readiness is a word with many
connotations. For the purposes of this survey the following
terms are defined:
combat readiness - the degree to which a ship is capable
of performing it's combat missions
material readiness - the levels to which a ship's systems,
equipment and material status will




the degree to which an organizational
unit of ships and attached assets
possesses the capability to complete
its designated missions
the degree to which a ship possesses
both combat and material readiness
Rate the importance of the following SWO professional
skills. First evaluate the degree to which they are
critical to job performance and then rate them with
regard to their contribution to ship's readiness.
Respond to each block of each question using the




















For questions 26 thru 30, respond to each block of each
question using the following 7 point scale:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly undecided strongly
disagree agree
26. Specialization implemented at the first tour department
head level would:
significantly improve fleetwide readiness.
significantly improve ship's material readiness.
significantly improve ship's combat readiness.
tend to produce CO's without the background, training
and experience to effectively command at sea.
tend to produce XO's who would be less effective than
a strict generalist.
27. Comparing a single 30 month department head tour with
the split 18 month tours, the longer single tour would
tend to:
_




allow department heads to become better warfighters.
_
subject the department head to greater career risks.
_
promote significantly higher levels of combat
readiness
enhance fleetwide readiness.
Statistics show that aviation officers perceive shore
tours that most closely emulate flying sea tours as
being the most desirable (top gun, strike u. , rag
instructor) . A similar perception, if it did exist
in the SWO community, would serve to improve combat
readiness by making training and evaluation command
assignments appear most desirable.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly undecided strongly
disagree agree
29. Comparing a detailing system that scheduled department
head assignment rotation based on ship's schedule
versus the present system. For example, department
heads would not ordinarily be allowed to rotate between
work-up and deployment or while on deployment but would
rotate after deployments, during overhaul/SRA and
before work-up cycles. The purpose being to provide
department head continuity through work-up and
deployment.
_
Such a system would tend to significantly increase
ship's combat readiness while deployed.
_
For such a system to have any impact on combat
readiness, it would have to be expanded beyond just
the department head level.
_
It would not affect officer retention because under
the present system department heads are not
reasonably certain of their rotation dates anyway.
_
Rotation of department heads in the work-up cycle or
while on deployment has little effect on readiness
during a deployment because readiness is most
heavily dependent on other factors.
_
Why change anything, ship's deploy as combat ready
as is humanly possible, while changes to the present
department head detailing system would just be
superfluous.
30. Implementation of Standard Operating Procedures (much
like EOSS) if standardized, properly technically
supported and subject to off ship review and inspection
would significantly increase the effectiveness of ships














Questions 31 thru 39 concern your perceptions of a few
aspects of SWO qualification.
For questions 31 thru 39 respond to each block of each
question using the following 7 point scale:12 3 4 5 6 7
strongly uncertain strongly
disagree agree
31. Indicate how you feel toward the methods now used to
qualify SWO's for their warfare device. The system is
defined as being composed of PQS, close observation and
oral boards.
The methods now used are quite adequate with regard
to the minimum criteria you believe the fleet
requires.
The present methods are unsatisfactory because their
appears to be no standardization in the level of
performance or expertise required to obtain SWO
qualification.
Oral boards are the best reasonable test of a SWO's
expertise, experience and ability to think on his
feet.
Fleetwide standardization of requirements for SWO is
not a relevant issue.
32.
_
Shipboard experience is the cornerstone of the
SWO qualification system above all else.
33.
_
It is the responsibility of a ship's CO to train
SWO's to be warriors above all else.
34.
_
The Navy should be as dedicated to SWO warfare
training as it is to damage control, material
readiness, enlisted training, etc.
35.
_
It is primarily the individual responsibility of a
SWO to not only do his job but also prepare himself
to be a warrior.
36.
_
The SWO qualification is a personal goal for every
SWO according to his own faculties and should not be
relegated to the programmed lock step mode
characteristic of other ship's training programs.
105
12 3 4 5 6 7
strongly uncertain strongly
disagree agree
37. The real value of SWO PQS is that (respond to each
block)
,
it is, primarily, a learning tool the prospective
SWO uses to gain basic warfare background
experience.
it sufficiently standardizes, fleetwide, the minimum
level of warfare qualification required of a SWO.
it is, primarily, a flexible tool which individual
commands adapt to suit their SWO qualification
requirements.
it, primarily, provides documentation to chart SWO
qualification progress.
it serves little value in relation to that gained
through actual watchstanding and operational
experience.
38. Concerning a requirement for SWO ' s to obtain an EOOW
letter before their XO tour,
I would not support the policy because I feel it
would not significantly contribute to command skills.
_
I would not support the policy because I feel the
opportunity to fulfill the requirement is too limited
for all SWO's to properly attain.
_
I would fully support the policy and believe it
should be a demanding qualification that is strictly
enforced.
_
I would support the policy but feel waivers should be
available to those with adequate justification.
12 3 4 5 6 7
strongly uncertain strongly
disagree agree
Some SWO ' s believe that a fleetwide SWO exam should be
administered as an additional reguirement for warfare
qualification. Under this proposal, a prospective SWO
would only be allowed to take the exam with his CO's
permission and only after meeting any other
requirements his CO may have.
Such an exam would serve to set a fleetwide minimum
standard for SWO qualification.
_
Such an exam would be a waste of time and resources
because the variety of missions, platforms, and
subject areas could not possibly be adequately
examined in a standardized exam.
Such an exam would be very beneficial to the
community and the Navy if it were administered in
multiple versions which accounted for the variety of
platforms and mission areas.
_
Any form of a written exam would unfairly
discriminate against outstanding SWO ' s who are just
not good test takers.
_
Such an exam, if focused on warfare skills, tactics,
systems and capabilities while covering only the
basics of engineering, damage control, administration
and repair could be universally applied fleetwide
regardless of the prospective SWO ' s background.
SECTION D
Questions 4 thru 52 request background data. It is
critical to the statistical analysis of this survey that the
demographics of the sample group be ascertained. Your
anonymity will be strictly maintained. However, if you do
not feel comfortable responding to one or more of the
questions in this section, please leave them blank.
For questions 4 thru 45, check only one response per
question.




41. How many years have you been an active duty officer?
_
















separated _ never married
other
Generally speaking your fitness reports are in the:
_
Top 1% and recommended
_
Top 3 0%








As a division officer, I have served on the following










As a department head, I have served on the following






















47. My last sea assignment was?
CO XO
_











49. Are you a "by letter" qualified Tactical Action
Officer?
Yes
No, but I have regularly stood the watch
No
50. Which of the following has the most influence on your






51. What significant non-operational billets have you been















52. In addition to SWO, what other qualifications have you









The best CO's and XO's are general ists rather than
specialists.
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A SWO must become a technical expert in a warfare
area (weapons, operations, engineering etc.) to be
successful in today's Navy.
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26. Specialization implemented at the first tour department
head level would:
tend to produce CO • s without the background, training
and experience to effectively command at sea.
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. 00
$. oo *****************>








tend to produce XO s who would be less effective than
a strict generalist.







27. Comparing a single 30 month department head tour with
the split 18 month tours, the longer single tour would
tend to:
allow department heads to become better warfighters.
Count Value One symbol equals approximately . 60 occurrem
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Std dev 1. 754
subject the department head to greater career risks.
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Comparing a detailing system that scheduled department
head assignment rotation based on ship's schedule
versus the present system. For example, department
heads would not ordinarily be allowed to rotate between
work-up and deployment or while on deployment but would
rotate after deployments, during overhaul/SRA and
before work-up cycles. The purpose being to provide
department head continuity through work-up and
deployment.
It would not affect officer retention because under
the present system department heads are not
reasonably certain of their rotation dates anyway.
Value One symbol equals approximately 1.00 occurrence
A. 00 **********************************************
5. 00 **************************
6 . oo **********************
7.00 ********************
10 20 30 2(0
Histogram frequency
.387 Std err .140 Median A. 000
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